The Twin Conjugacy Search Problem and Applications by Chen, Xiaoming et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
03
07
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Ju
n 2
01
8
The Twin Conjugacy Search Problem and
Applications
Xiaoming Chen1, Weiqing You2
1,2 Beijing Electronic Science & Technology Institute Beijing 100070, China
1 University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
chenxmphd@yeah.net, 894572560@qq.com
Abstract. We propose a new computational problem over the noncom-
mutative group, called the twin conjugacy search problem. This problem
is related to the conjugacy search problem and can be used for almost
all of the same cryptographic constructions that are based on the conju-
gacy search problem. However, our new problem is at least hard as the
conjugacy search problem. Moreover, the twin conjugacy search prob-
lem have many applications. One of the most important applications,
we propose a trapdoor test which can replace the function of the deci-
sion oracle. We also show other applications of the problem, including:
a non-interactive key exchange protocol and a key exchange protocol, a
new encryption scheme which is secure against chosen ciphertext attack,
with a very simple and tight security proof and short ciphertexts, under
a weak assumption, in the random oracle model.
Keywords: Twin conjugacy search problem, trap-door test, assump-
tion, CCA, non-commutative group, crypto, Diffie-Hellman
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and related work
The conjugacy search problem is a more important computational problem on
noncommutative groups while it is also a widely used cryptographic primi-
tive. In the context of quantum computing, Ko[1] first proposed a public key
encryption system based on the design of conjugate problems on the braid
group, which greatly promoted the development of the group theoretic cryp-
tography. It makes more and more scholars focus on the research of the conju-
gacy search problem and the public key cryptosystem and get many excellent
results[2,3,4,6,23]. Although the security of many cryptographic schemes on the
braid group has been questioned[7,8,14], non commutative groups have attracted
increasing attention[9,10,12].
The rapid development of quantum computing technology has aggravated the
threat to the existing public key cryptosystem[11,13]. However, the algorithm of
resisting quantum attack is also constantly proposed. It may be an effective
method to find the anti quantum attack algorithm on the non commutative
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group. As one of the difficult problems on the noncommutative group, the con-
jugacy search problem is very suitable for designing public key cryptosystems.
In recent years, many good papers have been put forward[15,16,17].
Recently, inspired by David Cash et al. [18], we found that the conjugacy
search problem has very similar results with the Diffie-Hellman problem, due to
space constraints we must defer the details of the theory.
1.2 The Diffie-Hellman problem and the Conjugacy Search problem
To illustrate the similarities between Diffie-Hellman problem and conjugacy
search problem more intuitively, show that:
Hashed-ElGamal Encryption Scheme Based on Diffie-Hellman Prob-
lem
KeyGenDH−hElG(K) :
(x, g,X)← GenKeyDH(K);
pk = (g,X), sk = x, where X = gx.
Epk(m) :
y ←R Zq, Y = g
y, Z = Xy, k = H(Y, Z), c = Ek(m);
output (Y, c).
Dsk(Y, c) :
Z = Y x, k = H(Y, Z),m = Dk(c);
output m.
Hashed-ElGamal Encryption Scheme Based on Conjugacy Search Prob-
lem[5]
KeyGenCSP−hElG(K) :
(x, g,X)← GenKeyCSP (K);
pk = (g,X), sk = x, where X = xgx−1.
Epk(m) :
y ←R G, Y = ygy
−1, Z = yXy−1, k = H(Y, Z), c = Ek(m);
output (Y, c).
Dsk(Y, c) :
Z = xY x−1, k = H(Y, Z),m = Dk(c);
output m.
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The ElGamal scheme[19] based on the Diffie-Hellman problem is a great
discovery in public key cryptography. The research in this aspect is more mature
than the ElGamal scheme based on the conjugacy search problem. For the sake of
conciseness, simplify the Hashed-ElGamal Encryption Scheme[20] to DH-hElG.
With the appropriate modification of the algorithm proposed by Ko[1], we get
the Hashed-ElGamal Encryption Scheme based on the conjugacy search problem
and simplify it to CSP-hElGamal.
Formally, there are many similarities between DH-hElG and CSP-hElG, and
the main difference lies in the computational characteristics of groups. David
propose a new computational problem called the twin Diffie-Hellman problem,
and its applications[18], it has solved important problems on the security proofs
of the Diffie-Hellman problem. Their results are very useful and amazing. In-
spired by the work of David Cash et al.[18], we find some new properties of the
conjugacy search problem on the noncommutative group.
1.3 Our result
In order to describe our work more succinctly, the braid group is used as the
implementation group of this theory, but all of our results can be applied to
any non commutative group, as long as the conjugacy search problem over it
is difficult and it has two exchangeable subgroups. In this paper, for the first
time, we define several security assumptions related to the conjugacy search
problem, and analyze the security of the CSP-hElG scheme under each security
assumptions. the main results are as follow:
1. We propose a new computation problem called the twin conjugacy search
problem, and prove that it is at least as hard as the ordinary conjugacy
search problem. When give a decision oracle, our new problem is still hard.
2. We show that a trapdoor test based on the twin conjugacy search problem,
and it can simulate the function of a decision oracle.
3. A non-interactive key exchange protocol and a key exchange protocol based
on the new problem are proposed, and we show that a new public key en-
cryption scheme which is secure against chosen ciphertext attack. Our proof
just need to a weak assumption, in the random oracle medel.
2 Preliminaries
Braid group is a typical non-commutative group, it is an important way that
using braid group as an implementation tool to explore cryptography algorithm
on non commutative group. There are many studies on the braid group and the
theory of cryptography[21,22]. However, this paper only takes it as a implemen-
tation tool, and we no longer spend too much space on the braid group. At the
same time, the reader does not have to fall into complex group theory. What we
have to explain is:
Difine Bn as a braid group generated by σ1, σ2, · · · , σn−1, and if
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{
σiσjσi = σjσiσj if |i− j| = 1
σiσj = σjσi if |i− j| > 2
Let LBl be the left subgroup of Bn, and let RBr be the right subgroup of
Bn, the following algebraic operations need to be noted
∀x ∈ LBl, ∀y ∈ RBr, then xy = yx
Conjugacy search problem is a very important computational problem in
non-commutative group. It is to be known that the problem is hard on the braid
group[9,10]. Describe the following
Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP) (g,X) ∈ Bn × Bn,, find x ∈ Bn such
that X = xgx−1
Compared with other groups, braid group has richer connotations and alge-
braic properties. However, the braid group is not necessary for our theory, and it
just for the conciseness of the narrative. In fact, our theory can be extended to
any noncommutative group as long as the conjugacy search problem is difficult
over it, and it have two commutative subgroups.
3 Security Assumptions
The security of public key cryptography rely on the security assumptions related
to a difficult problem. Here are some security assumptions associated with the
conjugate problem.
The Computional Conjugacy Search Assumption(The CCS Assump-
tion): We assume that it is hard to compute Z, given the values X and Y in
Braid group Bl+r. Define z := ccs(X,Y ), where X = xgx
−1, Y = ygy−1, Z =
xyg(xy)−1
Ko et al proposed a new public-key cryptosystem based on the braid group,
we make some improvements to it, and name it as the conjugacy search encryp-
tion scheme(the CS encryption schme), that is, the CSP-hElG Scheme in the
Introduction.
The CS encryption scheme: (Enc,Dec) is a pair of symmetric key encryption
algorithms while H is a hash function,H : Bl+r → {0, 1}
l(k), l(k) is a security
parameter. g is an element in Bl+r.
1. KeyGeneration One chooses a random element x in LBl, compute X =
xgx−1, then the public key is (X, g), while the private key is (x, g).
2. Encryption For cipher message m ∈ Bl+r, one chooses a random element y
in RBr, compute Y = ygy
−1, Z = yXy−1, k = H(Y, Z), c = Enck(m). The
ciphertext is (Y, c).
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3. Decryption Decipher get the target ciphertext (Y, c), compute Z = xY x−1, k =
H(Y, Z),m = Deck(c).
It has been proved that the CS encryption scheme is secure against chosen
plaintext attack. However, the CCS assumption is not sufficient to establish
the security of chosen ciphertext attack, even the H is a random oracle. To
illustrate the problem, an adversary selects group elements Yˆ , Zˆ randomly, to
encrypt a message m, compute kˆ = H(Yˆ , Zˆ), and cˆ = Enc
kˆ
(mˆ). Futher, assume
that the adversary gives the ciphertext Yˆ , cˆ to a decryption oracle obtaining the
decryptionm. It is easy to judge the equation Zˆ
?
= H(X, Yˆ ) through the equation
m
?
= mˆ. So, for random elements Yˆ , Zˆ, the adversary can answer Zˆ
?
= ccs(X, Yˆ )
through the decryption oracle, and the adversary can not do it on his own. So
the adversary can break the scheme easily by forge a legal ciphertext.
In fact, when the adversary get a decryption oracle, what he need to do is
compute ccs(X,Y ), after answering questions of the form ′is Zˆ
?
= ccs(X, Yˆ )′
many times. Thus, we need a stronger assumption to ensure the security of
Chosen-Ciphertext Attack(CCA).
The Strong CCS Assumption: We assume that it is hard to compute css(X,Y ),
given random X,Y in Bl+r, along with access to a decision oracle for the predi-
cate ccsp(X, ·, ·), which on input (Yˆ , Zˆ), returns ccsp(X, Yˆ , Zˆ), define the pred-
icate
ccsp(X, Yˆ , Zˆ) := ccs(X, Yˆ )
?
= Zˆ
It is not difficult to prove that the CS encryption scheme is secure against
chosen ciphertext attack when the H is modeled as a random oracle, under the
strong CCS assumption and if the underlysing symmetric cipher (Enc,Dec) is
itself secure against chosen ciphertext attack.citemypaper
Compare to the CCS assumption, The Strong CCS assumption is too stronger.
In genral, the weaker the assumption, the more secure the algorithm is, and the
results are more rigorous. To get CCA security under the CCS assumption, we
propose a new computational problem:
The Twin Conjugacy Search Problem(the twin CSP): (g,X1, X2) ∈
Bn ×Bn ×Bn, find x1, x2 ∈ Bn such that X1 = x1gx
−1
1 , X1 = x1gx
−1
1 .
Like the CS encryption scheme, we propose a new encryption scheme based
on the twin conjugacy search problem.
The Twin CS encryption scheme: (Enc,Dec) is a pair of symmetric key
encryption algorithms while H is a hash function,H : Bl+r → {0, 1}
l(k), l(k) is
a security parameter. g is an element in Bl+r.
1. KeyGeneration One chooses random elements x1, x2 in LBl, compute
X1 = x1gx
−1
1 , X2 = x2gx
−1
2 , then the public key is (X1, X2, g), while the
private key is (x1, x2).
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2. Encryption For cipher message m ∈ Bl+r, one chooses a random element y
in RBr, compute Y = ygy
−1, Z1 = yX1y
−1, Z2 = yX2y
−1, k = H(Y, Z), c =
Enck(m). The ciphertext is (Y, c).
3. Decryption Decipher get the target ciphertext (Y, c), compute Z1 = x1Y x
−1
1 , Z2 =
x2Y x
−1
2 , k = H(Y, Z),m = Deck(c).
Like the conjugacy search problem, we present the security assumption re-
lated the twin conjugacy search problem.
The Twin Computational Conjugacy Search Assumption (The twin
CCS assumption): Suppose that it is hard to compute Z1, Z2 in braid group
Bl+r, given the values X1, X2, Y in braid group Bl+r. Define
(Z1, Z2) := 2ccs(X1, X2, Y ) = (ccs(X1, Y ), ccs(X2, Y ))
where X1 = x1gx
−1
1 , X2 = x2gx
−1
2 , Y = ygy
−1, Z1 = (x1y)g(x1y)
−1, Z2 =
(x2y)g(x2y)
−1
In addition, we can present a stronger assumpution.
The Strong Twin Computational Conjugacy Search Assumption (The
Strong Twin CCS assumption): Suppose that it is hard to compute 2ccs(X1,
X2, Y ), given the values X1, X2, Y in braid group Bl+r, along with access to a
decision oracle for the predicate ccsp(X1, X2, ·, ·, ·), which on input Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2,
returns 2ccsp(X1, X2, Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2). Define the predicate
2ccsp(X1, X2, Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2) := (ccs(X1, Y ), ccs(X2, Y )) = (Z1, Z2)
It’s easy to know that the twin CS encryption scheme is secure against chosen
ciphertext attack when the H is modeled as a random oracle, under the strong
twin CCS assumption and if the underlysing symmetric cipher (Enc,Dec) is
itself secure against chosen ciphertext attack.
In above, we propose two encryption schemes and four kinds of security
assumptions related to the conjugate problem over the braid group. Next we’ll
discuss the relationships of each assumption, and the security of the twin CS
encryption scheme. One of our main results is the following:
Theorem 1. The CCS assumption holds if and only The strong twin CCS
assumption holds.
It is not hard to see that the twin strong CCS assumption implies the CCS
assumption, while the non-trivial direction to prove is that the CCS assumption
implies the strong twin CCS assumption. However, we need to defer the proof
of Theorem 1 to save space.
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4 A Trapdoor Test and a Proof of Theorem 1
In the following, we will propose another one of our results: Trapdoor test theo-
rem. Our theory is largely inspired by David[18]. David et al proposed the twin
Diffie-Hellman problem and a trapdoor test over general cyclic group, their works
are amazing, and it has greatly promoted the development of provable security
theory. However, our theory is based on the conjugacy search problem over the
non-commutative group. We emphasize
Lemma ∀ x, y ∈ Bn, Remember xy
−1 as x
y
, ∀r ∈ Bn, then
r(
x
y
)r−1 =
rxr−1
ryr−1
proof :
rxr−1
ryr−1
= rxr−1 · (ryr−1) = r(xy−1)r−1 = r
x
y
r−1
Now, we propose the main theory:
Theorem 2 (Trapdoor Test). Let Bl+r be a braid group, RBr and LBl are
right subgroup and left subgroup of the Bl+r. g is a random elemet on the group
of Bl+r, choice X1 ←R Bl+r, r ←R LBl, s ← RBr, define a random variable
X2 =
sgs−1
rX1r−1
, if Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2 are random elements on the Bl+r. Then we have:
(a.) X2 is uniformly distributed over G;
(b.) X1 and X2 are independent;
(c.) if X1 = x1gx
−1
1 , X2 = x2gx
−1
2 , x1, x2 ∈ LRl, then the probability that
the truth value of
Zˆ2 · rZˆ1r
−1 = sYˆ s−1 (1)
does not agree with the truth value of
Zˆ1 = x1Yˆ x
−1 ∧ Zˆ2 = x2Yˆ x
−1
2 (2)
is negligible; moreover, if (3) holds, then (2) certainly holds.
proof: Observe that
X2 =
sgs−1
rX1r−1
The elements s and r are randomly selected from RBr and LBl, respectively,
and X1 ∈ Bl+r . It is easy to verify that X2 is uniformly distributed over Bl+r,
and that X1, X2, r are mutually independent, from which (a.) and (b.) follow.
To prove (c.), condition on fixed values of X1, X2, suppose that Yˆ = ygy
−1, y ∈
RBr. If (2) holds, because of
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X2 =
sgs−1
rX1r−1
then
yX2y
−1 =
ysgs−1y−1
yrX1r−1y−1
=
sYˆ s−1
ryX1y−1r−1
That is,
sYˆ s−1 = (yX2y
−1)(ryX1y
−1r−1)
So,
Zˆ2 · rZˆ1r
−1 = (x2Yˆ x
−1
2 )r(x1Yˆ x
−1
1 )r
−1
= yX2y
−1ryX1y
−1r−1
= sYˆ s−1
Thus, while (2) holds, (1) certainly holds. Conversely, if (2) does not hold, we
show that (1) holds with a negligible probability. Observe that (1)
sYˆ s−1 = yX2y
−1 · (ryX1y
−1r−1) = Zˆ2 · rZˆ1r
−1
So
Zˆ2
−1
· yX2y
−1 =
rZˆ1r
−1
ryX1y−1r−1
= r
Zˆ1
yX1y−1
r−1 (3)
It is not hard to see, if Zˆ1 = x1Yˆ x
−1
1 and Zˆ2 6= x2Yˆ x
−1
2 , then (3) certainly
does not hold. This leaves us with the case Zˆ1 6= x1Yˆ x
−1
1 . But in the case, the
right hand side of (3) is a random element of Bl+r since r is uniformly distributed
over LBl, but the left hand side is a fixed element of Bl+r. It is easy to see that
the probability is negligible which select an element from Bl+r to make it equal
to a fixed element of Bl+r.
Now, we can prove the theorem 1 through the trapdoor test.
Theorem 1. The CCS assumption holds if and only The strong twin CCS
assumption holds.
Proof: The twin strong CCS assumption implies the CCS assumption obviously.
To prove that the CCS assumption implies the strong twin CCS assumption. Let
us define some terms:
assume that an adversary B who attack the CCS assumption, an adversary
A who attack the strong twin CCS assumption. B get the challenge instance
(X,Y ) of the CCS assumption, the target is to compute ccs(X,Y ).
First, B chooses r ←R LBl, s←R RBr, sets
X1 = X, X2 =
sgs−1
rX1r−1
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and giveA the challenge instance (X1, X2, Y ), A need to do to compute (Z1, Z2) =
2ccs(X1, X2, Y ).
Second, A chooses Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2 to query B, then B processes each decision query
Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2 by testing if Zˆ2 · rZˆ1r
−1 = sYˆ s−1 holds.
Finally, if and when A outputs (Z1, Z2), B tests if this output is correct by
testing if Z2 · rZ1r
− = sY s−1 holds. If this does not hold, then B outputs ”fail-
ure”, otherwise, B outputs Z1. The proof is easily completed using the trapdoor
test.
5 Twin CCS-ElGamal Cryptosystem
5.1 Security Model
The security model is portrayed by Indistinguishability-Game (IND-GAME),
mainly divided into three levels: Indistinguishability-Chosen Plaintext Attack
(IND-CPA) [24], Indistinguishability - (Non Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext At-
tack (IND-CCA) [25], Indistinguishability - (Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext At-
tack (IND-CCA2) [26]. We recall the definition for the CCA2.
Definition Indistinguishability - (Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext At-
tack (IND-CCA2) [26] The IND game of public key encryption scheme under
(Adaptive) chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is as follows
1. Initialization. The Challenger B generates the password system, and the
Adversary A obtains the system public key pk.
2. Training1. A sends the ciphertext C to the B, and B sends the decrypted
plaintext to A.(Polynomial bounded)
3. Challenge. The Adversary A outputs two messages of the same length, M0
and M1. The Challenger B chooses β ←R {0, 1}, cipher Mβ , and send ci-
phertext C∗ (Target ciphertext) to A.
4. Training2. A sends the ciphertext C(C 6= C∗) to the B, and B sends the
decrypted plaintext to A.(Polynomial bounded)
5. Guess. A output β′, if β′ = β, return 1, A attack success.
The advantage of the adversary A can be defined as a function of the param-
eter K:
AdvCCA2A (K) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[β′ = β]− 12
∣∣∣∣
If exist a polynomial time adversary A, there is a negligible function ε(K) that
makes AdvCCA2A (K) ≤ ε(K) set up, it is called IND-CCA2 security.
5.2 Key Exchange Protocol
In the following we propose a new non-interactive key exchanege protocol based
on the twin conjugacy search problem.
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Non-interactive Key Exchange Protocol: Suppose that the two parties
need to communicate are Alice and Bob. g is a random element in braid group
Bl+r. Alice’s secret key is (x1, x2), x1, x2 ∈ LBl pulic key is (X1, X2), where
X1 = x1gx
−1
1 , X2 = x2gx
−1
2 ; Bob’s secret key is (y1, y2), y1, y2 ∈ RBr, public
key is (Y1, Y2), where Y1 = y1gy
−1
1 , Y2 = y2gy
−1
2 . Keys which belong to Alice
and Bob are authenticated by a trusted third party, they can share the key:
– Alice compute x1Y1x
−1
1 , x1Y2x
−1
1 , x2Y1x
−1
2 , x2Y2x
−1
2
– Bob compute y1X1y
−1
1 , y1X2y
−1
1 , y2X1y
−1
2 , y2X2y
−1
2
Because of ccs(Xi, Yj) = xiYjx
−1
i = yjXiy
−1
j , i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, Alice and
Bob can compute the same value through the same hash function H :
k = H(ccs(X1, Y1), ccs(X1, Y2), ccs(X2, Y1), ccs(X2, Y2))
Key Exchange Protocol: Suppose that the two parties need to communicate
are Alice and Bob. g is a random element in braid group Bl+r.
1. Alice chooses random secret elements x1, x2 ∈ LBl and sends (X1, X2) to
Bob, where X1 = x1gx
−1
1 , X2 = x2gx
−1
2 ;
2. Bob chooses random secret elements y1, y2 ∈ LBl and sends (Y1, Y2) to Bob,
where Y1 = y1gy
−1
1 , Y2 = y2gy
−1
2 ;
3. Alice receives X1, X2 and compute x1Y1x
−1
1 , x1Y2x
−1
1 , x2Y1x
−1
2 , x2Y2x
−1
2 ;
4. Bob receives Y1, Y2 and compute y1X1y
−1
1 , y1X2y
−1
1 , y2X1y
−1
2 , y2X2y
−1
2 .
Because of ccs(Xi, Yj) = xiYjx
−1
i = yjXiy
−1
j , i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, Alice and
Bob can compute the same value through the same hash function H :
k = H(ccs(X1, Y1), ccs(X1, Y2), ccs(X2, Y1), ccs(X2, Y2))
5.3 The twin CS encryption scheme
Theorem 3. Suppose that H is modeled as a random oracle, The twin CS
encryption scheme is secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attack under the CCS
assumption and that the underlying symmetric cipher is itself secure against
chosen ciphertext attack.
Proof: It is easy to see that the twin CS encryption scheme is secure against
chosen ciphertext attack under the strong twin CCS assumption and that the
underlying symmetric cipher is itself secure against chosen ciphertext attack,
H is modeled as a random oracle. However, according to theorem 1, the CCS
assumption holds if and only if the strong twin CCS assumption holds. So, The
twin CS encryption scheme is secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attack under
the condition of the theorem 3.
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6 Conclusion
Our work would like to avoid making Stronger assumptions, or working with
specialized groups. All of the theory in this paper built in the braid group, how-
ever, our theory applies to any noncommutative group as long as the conjugacy
search problem is hard over it. Compare to the original CSP-scheme, we make a
little changes in the process of the encryption. In fact, the main achievement of
this paper is to extend the conclusion which the twin Diffie-Hellman problems
on general cyclic groups proposed by David Cash to the twin Conjugate Search
Problems on general noncommutative groups.
Acknowledgments. We thank any reviewers to comments our paper.
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